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ABSTRACT

One niche in which scholars have not looked for keys to the composing process is the sometimes illusory but vital area of nonlogical discourse, which includes fantasy, hallucination, dream, reverie, vision, trance, and meditation. Abundant evidence exists about the genesis, importance, and use of nonlogical discourse, but this evidence comes mainly from anthropologists, folklorists, psychologists, and mythographers. Many of these sources attribute nonlogical discourse to thought patterns of the primitive mind, hypothesizing that the creation of language and human religious impulses, both right hemispheric functions, complemented each other as cultures--and written expression--developed. Tribal initiation rites and naming are examples of how static, expressive discourse is used by people to satisfy their deities and the spirits of others. For primitive cultures, the sounds and noises of ceremonial, mythological, and religious actions are the basic language of life. Freud's research of dreams and the unconscious shows that the differences between the primitive and the modern mind may be found simply in the ratio of conscious to unconscious thought. Thus the composing process has nonlogical beginnings and developments; and studying the nonlogical forms of composing should help develop a better understanding of the modern composing process. (RL)

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Non-logical Discourse: Key to the Composing Process?

According to Professor Edward Corbett, "before we can teach writing, we must crack the mystery of the composing process."[1] Before we can "crack" the composing process, however, we need to understand what composing is, where it comes from, and what it means. I am not assuming here that I can answer all of these questions, but I do believe that rhetoricians and other scholars have almost exclusively looked in the wrong places, sometimes in the wrong ways, for the mystery of the composing process. Although all activities surrounding the act of composing need to be observed and studied,[2] I do not believe that the key or keys to this complex mental process can be discovered by simply observing what one's students do under examination situations, or even by studying what they write in their papers--or don't write.

Jacques Derrida has noted that "the history of writing [which, I might add, is what many consider "the viscera" of the composing process] is not explained by what we believe we know of the face and the hand, of the glance, of the spoken word, and of the gesture."[3] Although glances, gestures, other contortions, and learned or unlearned responses of the kind, are part of the writing process, they are usually ancillary components of the composing process. Interestingly, one niche in which scholars have not looked for keys to the composing process, at least not quantifiable keys, is in the sometimes illusory, but vital, area of non-logical discourse.

In his A Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric, Frank D' Angelo in the chapter on Syntagmatic Structure lists two main patterns of arrangement: logical and

non-logical. Logical patterns include such common modes as description, definition, and classificiation--all old stand-bys. But under non-logical patterns D' Angelo includes fantasy, hallucination, dream, reverie, vision trance, and meditation,[4] and later notes that "the non-logical patterns of arrangement are the most difficult to deal with in our present state of knowledge."[5] All of the specific examples of non-logical discourse D' Angelo lists are literary works.

I believe, however, that we have abundant evidence of and rationale for the genesis, importance, and use of non-logical discourse--but one must look mainly into investigations of the primitive mind--investigations accomplished largely by anthropologists, folklorists, psychologists, and mythographers. Perhaps the first step one must take in approaching an understanding of the meaning and importance of non-logical discourse is to look away, painful though it may be, from the classical rhetoricians. While it is true that the Greeks provided profound examples of methodical approaches to rhetoric, they did not deal adequately (sometimes, as a matter of fact, only superficially) with the composing process. Actually, writing, composing, and rhetoric might, in certain situations, be widely different methods, or means, of perception. The main stumbling block to the Greeks--at least when considering their ability to deal with and understand the composing process--was that their culture had become de-mythicized and profane long before the birth of Christ. Our modern, popular conception of the word myth, which is generally taken to mean absurdity or untruth, was taken from the Greeks. According to Mircea Eliade, the Greeks, from the time of Xenophanes, had steadily been emptying mythos of all religious and metaphysical value.[6] This is extremely important in the present discussion because non-logical discourse is largely the language of

myth--myth in the primitive sense, as something believed explicitly, as a cultural model embodying the ethos, desires, and ritual of the group which shares it. What Eliade shows, it seems to me, is that by losing touch with the complexities of viable myth, the Greeks had lost touch with true mythical thought. Thus, although Greek rhetorical thought has profoundly influenced our ideas of what writing is and should be, it is only a part of the composing process per se.

In approaching an understanding of non-logical discourse, one must be willing to enter a different world of time: a world in which linearity of thought, action, and language does not always exist on a rational, predictable scale. Actually, organic, consistent non-logical discourse is possible only in a value system which does not perceive time in a linear fashion, but in a cyclical, slowly moving, rythmic way. It is highly possible though, as I hope to show, that our modern perceptions of language and composing grew partly from patterns of non-logical discourse in the primitive mind.

What is writing means where and when does writing begin, says Derrida;[7] the same can be said for the composing process; indeed, when Derrida says writing he means what we would generally call composing, or what he on occasion refers to as arche-writing. The point is that arche-writing, to primitive peoples, is, in our linearly conceived universe, illogical. But to the primitive mind such language is highly logical and necessary. Actually, according to Julian Jaynes, in the mind he so aptly calls bicameral, the gods take (took) the place of consciousness.[8] The implications here for discourse are large: the simple encoder-decoder relationship in a mind that replaces consciousness with gods does not exist. Such a "communication situation"

would necessarily be represented by a highly amorphous structure--especially since the primitive perception of deity was not the simple "ask, and ye shall receive," situation of linear Christian thought. To the primitive a schemata of communication, and thus composing, might have looked like this:



Magic and ritual largely determined whether the gods would hear "the speaker," and thus formed the basis of primitive composing. Northrop Frye's assertion that "there seems to be no evidence whatever that man learned to speak primarily because he wanted to speak logically,"[9] is well taken here.

Although the thoughts and actions of the composing processes among primitives may look illogical through our eyes, there was an underlying logic in their communications of sacredness, their aesthetic but practical reaching out to deity, to higher beings, at times to other people. This aesthetic process of composing had a purpose: essentially that of bringing disharmony to harmony, of restoring balance to the imbalanced (which perhaps lies at the heart of our need to compose in modern society). Bronislaw Malinowski referred to such composing situations as "free outbursts of emotion in words and deeds, which accomplished the catharsis of dispelling tensions, of

restoring balance to imbalance."[10] Derrida calls such composing "a metaphor that systematically contrasts divine or natural writing and the human and laborious, finite and artificial inscription."[11] Derrida's point is important because it places the act of composing, largely a metaphoric act, in the realm of the natural and the divine: squarely within the auspices of myth.

Since the strictest notion of a general science of writing was born, for non-fortuitous reasons, around the Eighteenth Century,[12] our notion of what composing is, at least the science of the meaning of language and composing, is very young. We have little knowledge of what the power of the word, for example, meant to primitive peoples.[13] And herein we sleight the great prehistory of language, the mental process of being. Jaynes calls the primitive state of language a "rampant restless sea of metaphor"[14]--which is exactly what it is; but from this restless sea grew our modern processes of composing.

According to Jaynes (and I might add Derrida would bitterly disagree) writing as we know it was "a transmutation of speech into little marks on stone or clay or papyrus (or pages) so that speech can be seen rather than heard."[15] The importance of this statement lies in its establishment of composing as a process truly archetypal, a process growing, of course, from language, but pre-dating the actual physical process of writing, the striking of signs. Thus, composing had to have taken place before there was writing as we normally perceive it; and therefore composing is rather exclusively a mental rather than a physical process. "The behavior of primitive man," wrote Franz Boas, "and of the uneducated demonstrates that such linguistic classifications never rise into consciousness, and that consequently their origin must be sought, not in rational, but in automatic mental processes."[16]

Boas' statement should not be construed to mean that non-logical discourse is a babbling of the ignorant. Julian Jaynes has adequately shown, I believe, that what we call logical and non-logical discourse are simply different brain functions. According to Jaynes, "Speech, as has long been known, is a function primarily of the left cerebral hemisphere. But song, as we are presently discovering, is primarily a function of the right cerebral hemisphere."[17] Roughly, Jaynes' theory of functional bicamerality insists that what D' Angelo terms non-logical patterns were right brain functions among primitives, but that due to certain social, geographical, and biological changes, left brain-right brain functions were gradually blurred into what we call the modern mind.

Barre Toelken of the University of Oregon has recently discussed the findings of a UCLA research team working among the Hopi Indians. The team found, by brainwave analysis, that Hopi children use the right hemisphere for speaking and hearing Hopi, the left hemisphere for speaking and hearing English[18]--further evidence of a bicameral mind, as well as further evidence that the right hemisphere is the seat of the familiar and the archaic.

Jaynes also makes the point that the bicameral mind (distinct separation of right brain-left brain functions) was the abode of divinity, the place where the voices of gods were heard, and therefore the seat of myth and ritual.[19] Thus, Derrida can rightfully say that writing (he means composing) is the dissimulation of the natural, primary, and immediate presence of sense to the soul within the logos[20]--that non-logical discourse may be the means of expressing what we find most vital, most secret, most holy, most composable. According to Derrida, we should also add most indestructable, for he notes that systems of writing (composing) which were therefore more and other than

"means of communication" or vehicles of the signified remain indestructable.[21] If this is true, then our powers of and needs for non-logical expression are more lasting than our needs for other kinds of composing patterns.

"I believe," wrote Franz Boas, "that the origin of religious ideas . . . is just as little founded on reasoning as that of linguistic categories."[22] The reason for this, of course, is that the religious impulse is a right brain function. Boas also asserted that primitive man is not in the habit of discussing abstract ideas--that where philosophical problems are touched upon, they appear either in relation to definite individuals or in the more or less anthropomorphic forms of religious belief.[23] The profundity of Boas' ideas here lies in the notion that to savages religion was not an abstraction; by extrapolation one could say that some of the states of mind or expression we consider eminently non-logical (hallucinations, visions, dreams) may have been, most probably were, the very tissue of logic to primitives.

About the primitive use of some language types, Derrida says that "If writing [composing] is no longer understood in the narrow sense of linear and phonetic notation [which by now, it shouldn't be], it should be possible to say that all societies capable of producing, that is to say of obliterating, their proper names, and of bringing classificatory difference in to play, practice writing [composing] in general."[24] Naming in our culture is, I think, basically non-logical--at least it functions as a kind of static expressive discourse, mirroring the particular likes and dislikes of the parents, but to the primitive, naming was pure logic--names were taken from portents and events--and changed because of portents and events--to satisfy, partly at least, the deities and the spirits of others. As Sir James George

Frazer noted, "primitive man regards his name as a vital portion of himself and takes care of it accordingly."[25] He also asserted that by principles of savage philosophy the name is a vital part, if not the soul of man.[26] Claude Levi-Strauss also stressed the importance of naming to primitives. Quoting a Sixteenth-Century explorer who had contact with the Tupi-Kawahib Indians of Brazil, he explained that everytime the husband kills a prisoner his wife and he adopt a new name.[27] My point in discussing naming among primitives is simply to show that the primitive mind, largely because of myth and ritual, used and perceived certain composing practices differently than we do, and that to understand certain types of composing that we take for granted, we need to turn to the primitive mind. Such ways of thinking led, beyond naming, to early written forms of language which we are hard-pressed to understand.[28]

Levi-Strauss has admirably shown that, to use his words, the savage mind totalizes.[29] What he meant by totalizes is that primitive man did (does?) not view existence as a fragmented, yet related, series of causal events. Conversely, he sees life as a smoothly integrated whole which only becomes imbalanced through negative relationships to deity. Thus, a practice like naming was not viewed by archaic man as a novelty, but as an on-going, coherent part of the whole of language, of the power of the word, of the composing process.

In his famous Rites and Symbols of Initiation, Mircea Eliade discusses numerous instances of what I consider a primeval composing practice, a practice which was thoroughly grounded in myth and ritual, and which, I think, illustrates some basic attitudes toward the nature and importance of language. Among the Wiradjuri[30] of Australia one divinity, Daramulun, has a role of

prime importance in the initiatory rites of puberty. During the rites, male initiates are taken to a forest where they are instructed by their tutors, and where they witness the dances of medicine men, dances through which magical powers are displayed, such as the extraction of certain objects from the entrails of the dancers. During the initiation the boys must submit to hunger, silence, and other deprivations. At the apex of the ritual the novices are covered with blankets and told that the deity, Daramulun, is coming to burn them (which burning is part of the symbolic death-rebirth cycle). When the boys are covered with the blankets, the initiators proceed to extract an incisor from each initiate. When this ritual commences, other initiators whirl a type of primitive wind instrument in the air, which makes a roaring, rushing noise: thus its name, bull-roarer. The initiates are told that the horrible noise outside the cover of their blankets is the voice of Daramulun. After the extraction of the tooth, blankets are removed, and the boys are shown the bull-roarer, and told that the instrument is the deity. The myth in which the initiation is incorporated teaches the boys that during the ordeal they were actually killed by the god, cut to pieces, burned, and then restored to life, whole save the missing tooth.[31]

Frazer also discussed instances of the bull-roarer initiation among the Wonghi of New South Wales and the Binbing of the Gulf of Carpenteria. These people also associated the noise of the bull-roarer with the voice of deity, and part of the initiation among the Wonghi was to give a new name to the initiate after the removal of the tooth.[32] It is important that these people believed literally that the sound of the instrument was the voice of deity, much as they believed explicitly in the power of naming. Joseph Campbell

discusses similar cermonials among the Keraki of New Guineau, noting also that the noise of the bull-roarer represents the literal voice of deity.[33] Among the Bororo of Brazil the instrument and its sound are viewed with such reverential awe and dread that a woman who sees the piece is liable to be clubbed to death, evidently for a profanation of deity.[34] Malinowski also discussed the use of the bull-roarer among Australian tribes, noting that the symbology of the instrument was the third fundamental element, besides ordeal and the teaching of tradition, in the rites of passing into manhood.[35]

The importance of these "religious noises" is made evident in a statement by Jaynes. "Sound," he writes, "is the least controllable of all sense modalities, and it is this that is the medium of that most intricate of all evolutionary achievements, language."[36] If, in fact, language per se evolved from certain primitive sound systems, the accompanying ritual and mythic noises deserve a good deal of study by scholars in many disciplines. Another such sound akin functionally to the noise of the bull-roarer is what Northrop Frye refers to as "the universal Word at the opening of the Chhandogya Upanishad (where it is symbolized by the sacred word 'AUM'). . . ."[37] Actually, as Campbell has shown, AUM was thought of by believers in the Upanishads as a syllable, not a word: a religious, sacred noise. As the Mundaka Upanishad says:

> The syllable AUM is the bow; the arrow is the soul:
> Brahman is said to be the target.
> Undistractedly [meditating on AUM], one is to hit the mark.
> One is to become joined to the target, like an arrow.[38]

Interestingly, this symbol in ceremonial context can be represented by the rythym of the shaman's drum,[39] a religious noise very much like that produced by the bull-roarer. The repetition of such sacred noises among primitives served deeply religious purposes, operating as a vehicle through which the universe might be better understood, restoring harmony to disharmony. Folklorist Don Yoder, in a statement that seems to capture the mythic essence of sacred noises and speech says that "salvation, like healing, restores broken unities," and he goes on to stress that this healing is reflected linguistically.[40]

My claim is that these sounds were vital parts of the primitive composing process, an understanding of which might reveal the key to the modern process of composing. Derrida writes that "writing [composing] in the narrow sense--and phonetic writing above all--is rooted in a past of non-linear writing."[41] This statement is profound, and suggests that our modern system of linear composition evolved from the nonlinear systems of antiquity: the language and sounds of myth and religion, a unified view of composing that was inseparable from other vital human functions. "To rediscover access to this unity [of non-linearity]," he writes, "we must de-sediment 'four thousand years of linear writing.'"[42] This is precisely the point Jaynes makes in his discussion of the bicameral mind.

What we are seeing then in the movement from distinct bicamerality to the linear brain of today is a movement from the mind of <u>illiterature</u> to the mind of <u>literature</u>,[43] from the mind of cyclical perceptions to the mind of empirical, Newtonian cause-effect relationships. However, in the movement from an illiterate to a literate mind, whatever spawned the change, our ritual and mythical use of language was not totally abandoned--and this is

where I suggest the rhetorician and composition scholar, not to mention the linguist and anthropologist, need to look for further illumination of the composing process.

Freud discovered that certain external forces, such as pain, can cause a reversion to primitive forms of composing. He relates the incident that

> The doctor, who had been asked to look after the Baroness at her confinement, pronounced that the moment had not come, and suggested to the Baron that in the meantime they should have a game of cards in the next room. After a while a cry of pain from the Baroness struck the ears of the two men: 'Ah, mon Dieu, que je souffre!' Her husband sprang up, but the doctor signed him to sit down: 'It's nothing. Let's go on with the game!' A little later there were again sounds from the pregnant woman: 'Mein Gott, mein Gott, what terrible pains!'--'Aren't you going in, Professor?' asked the Baron. --'No, no. It's not time yet.'--At last there came from the next door an unmistakable cry of 'Aa-ee, aa-ee, aa-ee!' The doctor threw down his cards and exclaimed: 'Now it's time.'[44]

Although Freud's main intent was to discuss the purpose and nature of the doctor's joke, he did note that this instance "shows how pain causes primitive nature to break through all the layers of education."[45] From this and other evidence it seems to me that the composing process is essentially a transformation of illiterature to literature--illiterature being what might be called our un-selfconscious image of ourselves and the universe, literature the self-concious image. That is why, as Jaynes correctly asserts, "oral poetry

is a very different species from written poetry."[46]--although written poetry very likely had its genesis in oral poetry. What this all means, in some important ways, at least, is that logical discourse (as we see it today in all its linear glory) grew directly from non-logical discourse; that is not only a major underlying thesis in the work of Julian Jaynes, but also in the work of Robert Graves.

Despite the fact that there are important basic differences between the primitive mind and the modern, "when all is said and done," wrote Frazer, "our resemblances to the savage are still far more numerous than our differences from him."[47] Indeed, Freud's research of dreams and the unconscious shows that the differences between the primitive and the modern mind may be found simply in the ratio of conscious to unconscious thought. Thus, as D' Angelo notes, dreams are an important aspect of non-logical discourse, a manifestation of a very real other-self. The complex relation between language, consciousness, and unconsciousness was treated by Freud when he wrote

> . . . for, as we have learnt from the dream-work, the connecting paths which start out from words are in the unconscious treated in the same way as connections between things. An unconscious cathexis offers far more favourable conditions for selecting the expression. Moreover, we can immediately assume that the possible form of expression that involves a yield of verbal pleasure exercises the same downward drag on the still unsettled wording of the preconscious thought as did the unconscious purpose in the earlier case.[48]

The connections between verbal pleasures and dream work, showed Frued, are immutable, just as the connections between myth and ritual and certain types of language (composing) to primitives were inseparable. In such non-logical uses of sound as the bull-roarer (and this is of course true in the relationship between consciousness and unconsciousness) "the unconscious purpose drags the preconscious thought down into the unconscious and there gives it a new shape."[49] For the savage, the new shape was the world of adulthood arrived at through the ecstasies and rigors (physical and linguistic) of initiation, the passage from puberty to manhood, innocence to knowledge.

In some ways our re-shaping of the world through the use of non-logical discourse is not unlike the primitive initiation rituals, except that our deities take other shapes, other forms. Let me illustrate with an experience of my own.

Not long ago, when I was functioning (or at least trying to) as Director of Composition at Brigham Young University, I received a letter from a student. The young lady who penned the piece complained about one of the textbooks we were using in our Freshman English program. The complaint itself was simply representative of a type I had grown accustomed to: prosaic, mildly biased, generally uninformed. However, the really important part of the letter was not on the inside, but the outside, on the envelope. Instead of addressing the letter to me as Director, she had written President Poulsen.

In the Mormon heirarchy, President is an ecclesiastical term used not only for the Prophet of the Church, but also for the heads and directors of certain lower-level offices. What the young lady had done, then, was address me as an ecclesiastical rather than an academic authority. At first glance,

this may seem rather commonplace, but I think she was simply doing obeisance to the gods, so to speak. To address me as President precluded my academic function and stressed a hypothetical, ecclesiastical position. I believe the word President to her, used in the context of the letter of complaint, represented much the same thing that the sound of the bull-roarer did to the Wiradjuri: the approaching of deity (an authority figure), and initiation into another state of being.

The student probably had never written a similar letter, and in her fear and apprehension she chose (whether consciously or unconsciously) to employ the language of religion, the sound of mythos. Julian Jaynes would probably say this was a lapse into the bicameral mind; Freud would have called it an inverse act of sublimation. Whatever prompted her use of the term President, I think it stands as an example in our own culture of thought processes which I consider essentially primitive, but which form an important part of the composing process of virtually all human beings, a process which in some ways may seem non-logical, but which functions among primitives and moderns alike to restore balance to imbalance, harmony to disharmony, order to a world of chaos.

Notes

[1] Professor Corbett made this statement in a seminar session titled "Studying the Composing Habits of Your Students," at the annual Wyoming Conference on Freshman and Sophomore English at the University of Wyoming, July, 1978.

[2] See Janet Emig's The Composing Processes of Twelfth Graders (Urbana: NCTE, 1971), for an example of this scholarly stance. See also Sharon Crowley's "Components of the Composing Process," College Composition and Communication 28 (May 1977): 166-169.

[3] Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 84. I am well aware of the latent difficulties in quoting Derrida. Here, and whenever I refer to him, I have tried to make absolutely sure I am attributing to him things he actually says.

[4] See Frank D' Angelo, A Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, 1975), pp. 57-58. See also James L. Kinneavy's A Theory of Discourse (Englewood Clifss, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1971), p. 393 for a brief discussion of other nonlogical modes. Kinneavy includes these in his chapter on Expressive Discourse. The term "non-logical" is, of course, inadequate since there is a kind of logic behind all discourse.

[5] D' Angelo, p. 59.

[6] Mircea Eliade, Myth and Reality (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1975), p. 1. See also Robert Graves, The White Goddess (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976), p. 223. Graves notes:

"The prosaic method [of thought] was invented by the Greeks of the Classical age as an insurance against the swamping of reason by mythographic fancy. It has now become the only legitimate means of transmitting useful knowledge."

[7] Derrida, p. 28.

[8] Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p. 72.

[9] Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 332. Notice also the following statement of Franz Boas taken from The Mind of Primitive Man (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 130: " . . . primitive man, and civilized man as well, imitates not such actions only as are useful and for the imitation of which logical causes may be given, but also others for the adoption or preservation of which no logical reason can be assigned."

[10] Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1954), pp. 80-81.

[11] Derrida, p. 15.

[12] Ibid., p. 27.

[13] I am thinking here of the literal power of the word espoused by most Native American peoples, as well as by ancient Irish and Finnish folk. See for example Sir James George Frazer's discussion of the power of the word in The Golden Bough (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 288.

[14] Jaynes, p. 51.

[15] Ibid., p. 68.

[16] Boas, p. 190.

[17] Jaynes, p. 365. Interestingly, Claude Levi-Strauss notes that "the 'archetypal cheese,' therefore is not always the same for me, according to whether I am thinking in French or in English." See Structural Anthropology (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), p. 93.

[18] Barre Toelken, The Dynamics of Folklore (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), p. 225.

[19] Jaynes, p. 159.

[20] Derrida, p. 37.

[21] Ibid., p. 93.

[22] Boas, p. 192.

[23] Ibid., p. 196.

[24] Derrida, p. 109.

[25] The Golden Bough, p. 284.

[26] Ibid., p. 298,

[27] Claude Levi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques (New York: Atheneum Books, 1975), p. 353.

[28] Jaynes notes that " . . . the earliest writing of men in a language we can really comprehend, when looked at objectively reveals a very different mentality from our own." p. 82.

[29] Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 245.

[30] These same rites are very similar among other Australian tribes, such as the Arunta, Yuin and Murring.

[31] Mircea Eliade, Rites and Symbols of Initiation (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1975), p. 13 and elsewhere. See also Myth and Reality, p. 102,

where Eliade discusses the importance of the noise of deity among the African Ngakola secret society. Holy noises and puberty rites seem to inevitably go hand in hand.

[32] The Golden Bough, pp. 802-803.

[33] Joseph Campbell, The Flight of the Wild Gander (South Bend, Indiana: Gateway Editions, 1969), p. 57.

[34] Tristes Tropiques, p. 230.

[35] Malinowski, p. 39.

[36] Jaynes, p. 97.

[37] Frye, p. 126.

[38] Quoted by Campbell, p. 169.

[39] Ibid., p. 169.

[40] Don Yoder, "Hohman and Romanus: Origins and Diffusion of the Pennsylvania German Powwow Manual," in American Folk Medicine ed. Wayland D. Hand (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 240. Frazer referred to the secret names of initiates and the names of Gods as "mystic sounds" (p. 302). Derrida also calls one aspect of writing [composing] "participation in a quasi-religious secret." (p. 126), and Robert Graves notes that "Religious necessity is always a far likelier explanation of changes in an alphabet than phonetic theory. . . ." (p. 243)

[41] Derrida, p. 85.

[42] Ibid., p. 86.

[43] I am indebted to Albert B. Friedman for the use of these terms. In his Folk Ballads of the English-Speaking World (New York: Viking Press, 1956), p. ix, he distinguishes between folk ballads as illiterature (that is, communal

property of the folk) and art poetry as literature: conscious, individual products dealing mainly with aesthetics rather than cultural norms and values.

[44] Sigmund Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963), p. 81.

[45] Ibid., p. 81.

[46] Jaynes, p. 78.

[47] The Golden Bough, p. 307. This, of course, is the thesis of Boas' The Mind of Primitive Man.

[48] Freud, p. 177.

[49] Ibid., p. 176.